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SUMMARY 
With the passage of California's Proposition 13 in 1978, local government's interest in 
contracting out or privatizing government services increased as a way to contend with 
reduced revenues. Nationwide local government has been increasing the number of 
services that they contract out since the recessions of the early 80s and 90s. By the 1990s 
researchers have estimated that the average U.S. city contracted out 27 percent of its 
municipal services for a savings ofbetween 15 and 50 percent. 
Privatization is a term that includes competitive contracting as well as deregulation, 
divestiture, franchises, grants and subsidies, leases, public/private partnerships, service 
shedding (where a private firm assumes the ownership, control and delivery of a service), 
sale of assets, and vouchers. The privatization of government services can be broken 
down into levels based on how much responsibility government turns over to private 
firms. The most common level is when government maintains overall responsibility of 
services but contracts out auxiliary services such as accounting, billing or data base 
maintenance. The next level is the contracting out of day to day management while 
maintaining overall responsibility such as garbage and recycling in some communities. 
The final level, as mentioned above, is service shedding where a private firm both owns 
and manages the service provision of what many consider a government service, such as 
public utilities. 
Technically, privatization means the transition of a service from being government 
operated to being run by a private firm. The term has also come to describe the provision 
of what is traditionally considered a public service by a private firm, whether or not a 
particular local government ever provided that service. For example, if a city never had a 
fire department of its own and hired a private firm to provide the service, even though the 
city's fire service did not convert from public to private provision, the act of using a 
private firm for the service might be described as privatization. In the context of this 
paper, this is how the term privatization will be used. 
The proponents of privatization argue that it will improve service and lower costs mainly 
by encouraging competition. Opponents claim that privatization reduces important 
public services to a commodity and as such, quality will suffer as private companies try 
to increase their profits. Those against privatization also argue that private firms will 
only serve those that are easiest to serve, undermining the democratic ideals and values of 
our society. 
Fire protection service has proved difficult to privatize, both because of community and 
firefighter resistance. There are no communities in California with private fire protection 
service. The State has a strong history of municipal fire service and private companies 
usually try to avoid communities with established municipal fire departments. 
Some public services lend themselves more easily to privatization than others. The more 
valued a service is to society, and the greater the consequences if quality is not 
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maintained and service not provided to all, the less likely that service is to be privatized. 
This may well be the case with the privatization of fire protection service. 
All communities have different fire service needs and private companies often base their 
service levels on these needs as well as the level of service for which the community is 
willing to pay. This has made it difficult to compare private and municipal fire protection 
services though it is generally believed that private companies are more cost effective for 
a number of reasons. Many proponents of privatization argue that service provision by 
private providers alone does not reduce costs. Instead, it is competition that encourages 
effectiveness in both public and private service provisions. 
More municipal services are adopting the practices ascribed to private fire companies as 
they contend with changes in the nature of firefighting. In California, with its strong 
tradition of municipal service, other cost savings options are being developed including 
consolidation and intergovernmental contracting. Ultimately, reductions in the number of 
fires, as well as competition among public fire service and the threat of privatization, may 
create the needed incentives and competition that lead to effectiveness in fire protection 
service in the State. 
WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PRIVATIZE SERVICES 
In California, there is a tendency to start discussions of current local government 
activities and finances with the 1978 passage ofProposition 13. Although privatization, 
the provision of what are considered public services provided by private firms, is not a 
new concept in California, many of the concerns addressed by the proposition are similar 
to those that are said to be remedied by privatization. One of the arguments for 
Proposition 13 was that local governments were wasting taxpayer dollars through 
inefficiency. The belief was that local government had the funds to adequately provide 
services but that there was no incentive to use the funds wisely or efficiently. The 
passage of Proposition 13 cut local government revenues, dramatically altering how local 
governments finance themselves and pressuring them to reduce their costs while 
maintaining service levels. 
This search for efficient ways to provide services was not limited to California. 
Nationwide, contracts between local government and private firms tripled from 1972 to 
1982 increasing from $22 billion to $65 billion, after adjusting for inflation. Some 
experts estimate that during this time the practice of contracting out grew at 16 percent a 
year. 1 
This interest in improving efficiency increased with the recessions of the early 80s and 
90s. During this time, local government struggled to adjust to its decreasing fortunes, 
even as citizens continued to demand high quality services and voted to minimize 
additional local government revenue sources. The increase in privatization was further 
encouraged by the policies and actions of the Reagan administration that made 
privatization more attractive to the private sector, reduced federal funds available to local 
government for service provision, and promoted privatization.2 By the early 1990s, one 
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researcher reported that the average U.S. city contracted out 27 percent of its municipal 
services in whole or in part to private firms, with all cities contracting out at least one 
service.3 Several reports say that by doing so cities saved, on average, between 15 and 50 
percent on these services.4 
A National League of Cities survey conducted in 1991, during the depths of the 
recession, reported that one in four cities showed a gap between their revenues and 
expenditures of more than five percent. In some cases this was due to a decrease in 
revenues and in other cases to expenditures that increased more rapidly than revenues. 
The survey also found that smaller communities were more likely to have a larger gap 
and that this gap could seriously affect their ability to provide municipal services.5 The 
prospect of closing this gap by saving 15 to 50 percent through service privatization was 
very attractive to local governments. 
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HISTORY OF PRIVATIZATION 
Researchers have traced the origins of privatization to the seventeenth century. 6 At that 
time, Britain commissioned "privateers," or pirates, to help them maintain their control of 
the high seas by collecting government imposed taxes or duties from ships. In the United 
States, the use of private firms to provide what we now consider public services predates 
the U.S. Constitution with the provision of postal service. The provision of public 
services by private firms was common in U.S. cities in the early part of the 20th century, 
especially for garbage collection and local streetcar systems. 
Progressive reformers in the 1920s led a push to institutionalize service delivery within 
government. They were motivated by the belief that widespread corruption was enabled 
by the contracting out of government services and this was undermining the efficiency 
and integrity of government. It was not until after World War TI that the privatization of 
government services started to become popular again. 
Local governments now contract out for a myriad of services, including tree trimming, 
garbage pickup, wastewater treatment, street maintenance, data entry, and janitorial 
services, to name only a few. In the last decade, privatization has continued to expand in 
areas that we traditionally consider the realm of government such as prisons, social 
services, and public safety. Attempts to privatize fire protection services have proven to 
be especially controversial. The local newspaper in one community said the debate over 
the privatization of its fire department had "split the city like a civil war.m 
FOR AND AGAINST PRIVATIZATION 
The main argument put forth by the proponents of privatization is that it improves service 
and lowers costs through competition. Improved service includes the ability to bring in 
experts, to incorporate the newest technology, and to avoid time-consuming red tape that 
hinders innovative approaches. Accountability is ensured because government has the 
ability to select and cancel services and the threat of losing a contract will encourage 
accountability and quality service from private contractors. This assumes that 
competition exists and that alternative service providers are available. 
On the other side, opponents of privatization argue that public sector jobs will be lost and 
service quality will suffer, especially for clients or residents that are more difficult to 
serve, as private firms will always work to reduce their costs even at the expense of 
quality and equity. They point out that there are no safeguards to prevent private 
companies from working to reduce competition or creating monopolies, and no guarantee 
of consistent service, since a private contractor could decide not to renew its contract if it 
is no longer profitable. The contractor could also go out of business or change owners, 
all if which could threaten the provision of consistent, quality service. In addition, the 
fear of corruption is still a concern, as it was in the 1920s. There are studies that support 
the assertions ofboth sides, which will be reviewed later in this report. 
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Major Potential Advantages and Problems with Delivery of Public 
Services by For-Profit Companies 
Potential Advantages Potential Problems 
• Less red tape and bureaucracy . • Higher potential for corruption 
because of lack of oversight. 
• More competition leading to • Incentives to reduce service quality. 
increased efficiency and cost 
savings for both private and public 
service providers. 
• Improved service quality and • Increased chance of service 
expertise. interruptions due to contract 
cancellations, negotiations, strikes, or 
business failure. 
• Lower unit costs because of ability • Labor conflicts because of the loss of 
to buy in quantity if operating in public sector jobs. 
multiple jurisdictions. 
• Savings can be used to fund other • Savings benefit private companies not 
important local services. taxpayers. 
Many who have studied privatization believe that one sector is not superior to the other. 
They claim that the public and private sectors have different strengths and weaknesses 
and neither is innately better or worse than the other is. Privatization can maximize the 
strengths of both sectors. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler write in their popular book 
Reinventing Government: 
Business does some things better than government, but government does 
some things better than business. The public sector tends to be better, for 
instance, at policy management, regulation, ensuring equity, preventing 
discrimination or exploitation, ensuring continuity and stability of 
services, and ensuring social cohesion . . . . Business tends to be better at 
performing economic tasks, innovating, replicating successful 
experiments, adapting to rapid change, abandoning unsuccessful or 
obsolete activities, and performing complex or technical tasks.8 
However, the argument goes deeper than a discussion of measurable strengths and 
weakness to the question of the true role of government. Those that favor privatization 
agree with E. S. Savas of Baruch College, an expert on privatization of government 
services. He states: 
Privatization not only saves money, it restores government to its 
fundamental purpose, governing, by relieving it of tasks like collecting 
trash, repairing streets and mowing grass that a competitive private 
sector-under public control--does better and more cheaply.9 
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Those who are opposed to privatization believe that certain government services are 
rights that we are all entitled to and privatization threatens the equal provision of these 
services by encouraging efficiency at the expense of quality and removing public 
oversight. Opponents contend that private firms do not answer to the public, and, that 
their practices and policies are not as open to public view as are those of the public 
sector. This lack of information could reduce the ability of citizens to participate in 
policy formation, monitoring, or regulation. This in tum diminishes democracy by 
separating government from citizens and undermining democratic participation. 
David Morris of the Institute of Local SelfReliance, a not-for-profit organization that 
promotes sustainable community practices, argues for a more careful evaluation of 
privatization rather than just cost reduction. In his 1996 article, "The Dark Side of 
Privatization," he asks, "Does privatization affect our sense of community? Our concept 
of citizenship?" He laments; "Almost 100 percent of the privatization debate revolves 
around a discussion of dollars and cents. This is unfortunate. There is a lot more at stake 
here. We should discuss privatization's impact on democracy as well as efficiency."10 
A 1986 Business Week article talks about the sometimes fragile balance between 
democracy and capitalism that is highlighted by privatization. The author writes, "We 
Americans are not just buyers and sellers; we are also citizens."11 As citizens, he 
explains, we qualifY for some services that as consumers we could not afford to purchase. 
Government's role, he argues, is to maintain the balance between our social/political 
ideals and economic ideals by providing these services based on our citizenship, not our 
ability to pay. 
The social cost argument against privatization continues in the vein that cost of service 
should not be the only consideration in whether or not government provides services or 
contracts out. This viewpoint contends that there are other costs that should be 
considered in the equation. Private firms pay lower wages, healthcare, and retirement 
benefits than municipal government. These cost savings for private companies are then 
passed on to government and taxpayers at a later date, undermining the true cost savings 
of privatization. The other argument presented by proponents of the social cost argument 
is that public sector jobs provide access to social mobility for minorities, new 
immigrants, and the poor. They believe that because private firms do not have the same 
requirements to diversifY staff, these firms do not provide this opportunity. Most 
proponents of privatization would argue, however, that privatization of service does not 
mean that government abdicates the responsibilities of providing equitable, quality 
services. Contracts with private firms can include provisions for performance and service 
quality levels. They can also require a certain level of benefits and equal employment. 
FIRE DEPARTMENT PRIVATIZATION 
An estimated 25 percent of cities contract with private ambulance services. 12 The bed 
capacity ofU.S. private prisons has increased from 15,300 in 1990 to 145,160 in 1999. 13 
These are only two of the multitude of public services that local governments regularly 
contract out. For the most part, the privatization of government services has occurred 
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without the public outcry or political fallout that seems to have accompanied attempts to 
privatize fire protection services. Communities become battlegrounds, friendships are 
ruined, and city council members find themselves making unplanned career changes 
when a community considers privatizing its fire protection services. 
What are the concerns surrounding fire protection privatization and are they valid? Fire 
department privatization faces much the same criticism as the privatization of other 
government services. It focuses on the fear that private companies will pursue cost 
savings at the expense of quality services, which in the case of fire protection could 
jeopardize public safety. The other major barrier to privatization is the loss of public 
employee jobs. While the public may have misgivings about private fire protection, the 
firefighters' unions are adamant in their resistance. 
Because there are few examples in the United States of private fire protection service, 
this paper looks at examples of both private fire service provision and the private 
provision of other government services. Following is some of the data that reflects 
privatization's impact on the issues of cost savings, quality of service, and job loss. 
SAVINGS 
When looking at a variety of services, studies have found that privatization saves local 
governments money. A 1990 study by the International City/County Managers 
Association (ICMA) found that 40 percent of local governments saved between 10 and 
19 percent through privatization. 14 Another 40 percent saved more than 20 percent, and 
some governments reported cost savings as high as 40 percent. 
Some argue that this is because privatization encourages competition, which in turn 
fosters efficiency. Others argue that savings are at the expense of employees who are 
paid less or receive fewer benefits. As mentioned, some believe this is not true savings 
because it could increase social costs by passing on health and retirement costs to 
government and taxpayers. 
James Mercer, President and CEO of the Georgia based Mercer Group which studies 
some private service provision for government, identifies the following reasons that 
privatization is able to reduce costs for local governrnent. 15 
• Reduced personnel and equipment needs. Government can hire fewer 
employees and invest in less equipment, reducing infrastructure and 
maintenance costs. This attribute is especially valuable when it comes to new 
technology because government takes more time to upgrade and can be 
outpaced by the speed of innovation. Government can also gain access to 
expertise they may not otherwise be able to afford if they had to hire a full-
time employee. 
• Ability to pay only for work done. Government can pay for a service from a 
private company and not make the investment in hiring, education, and 
salaries. It also allows government to meet uneven work flows without hiring 
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new employees that they may not need normally. In the case of fire fighters, 
there is a lot of down time. Private companies use this time for other 
profitable activities and can pass the savings on to their clients. 
• More work for same amount of dollars. Private employees work longer 
hours for the same salary. 
• No start-up costs. Initial investment in infrastructure is often costly and can 
be prohibitive to government. 
• Reduced internal workload. By contracting out services, government staff 
can focus on priorities. 
Private fire service cost reductions is also believed to stem from these categories. The 
Reason Institute, in a 1992 policy studyl6 on fire department privatization, highlights four 
major reasons that private fire companies can provide fire protection service for less than 
a municipal department. 
1. Private fire departments spend less on labor and other personnel costs by using a 
mixed force of full-time paid firefighters and reservists. Labor costs typically 
account for 70-90 percent of a paid department's expenses. Although salaries for 
private companies are usually comparable or slightly higher, they often reflect longer 
work hours. Pensions and other benefits also tend to be reduced in the private sector 
although some private companies do have profit sharing plans. 
2. Firefighters typically have a lot of down time when they are not fighting fires. 
Private companies use this time to provide other job-related services that either bring 
in revenue or reduce firefighting costs. These could include ambulance and 
paramedic services, the developing of fire safety plans, conducting fire safety audits 
ofbuildings, training industrial fire brigades, installing and monitoring alarms, and 
education and fire prevention campaigns. 
3. They use innovative strategies and technologies to prevent and combat fires. 
Rural/Metro, the large private fire protection company that is based in Scottsdale, 
Arizona, worked to have laws passed in Scottsdale requiring residential, industrial 
and commercial sprinklers, which considerably reduced the costs of fighting fires. 
This effort benefited the community by reducing fire insurance costs for homeowners 
about 75 percent. 17 The National Fire Protection Association recommends sprinkler 
installation but adoption is optional. In California, sprinkler requirements are decided 
at the local level and their adoption is far from uniform. Rural/Metro has also 
designed some of its fire trucks to meet its specific needs. 
4. Finally, larger private companies have more purchasing flexibility and less 
procedures for purchasing than municipalities, which allows them to take advantage 
of opportunities for savings. 
Many people seem to make the general assumption that private companies can provide 
service more cheaply than government because they consistently use the above listed 
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measures from the Reason Foundation. The Mercer Group privatization study from 1997 
found that many experts and state and local government officials did not see higher costs 
as being related to public versus private, but as a result of the existence of public 
monopolies and the absence of competition. 18 This sentiment is echoed by many that 
argue for more efficient government. However, as opponents of privatization point out, 
both public and private services can become monopolies. This implies that both private 
and public fire protection services that look for ways to reduce costs, or are prompted to 
do so by competition, may be capable of providing more efficient service. 
There is nothing to prevent public fire companies from using the same cost reductions as 
private firms and some do. Researchers often cite case studies that public services can 
compete with private firms if they strive for efficiency. Some cities, such as Phoenix, 
Arizona, have instituted private/public competition or managed competition. This 
method of contracting out lets a city department bid against private contractors. Managed 
competition is thought to provide an incentive to public departments to increase their 
efficiency, while maintaining institutional knowledge in the city, and reducing city 
employee resistance to privatization. The City of Phoenix is estimated to have saved $30 
million dollars as of 1998 by using this process. 19 
In the case of the City of Westminster, California, which is discussed later in this paper, 
the city accepted bids from both public and private fire protection services. The Orange 
County Fire Authority, a public agency, underbid Rural/Metro, the large private company 
that started in Scottsdale, Arizona by $500,000 for a five-year fire protection contract. 
Service provided by Orange County may have been cheaper for some of the same reasons 
that private firms can be less expensive; it already operated in the area and benefited from 
its scale and existing infrastructure. 
There is some difficulty in comparing costs between public and private fire protection 
primarily because a community does not seriously consider a private company unless 
there are cost savings. Communities also have different fire protection needs and 
different characteristics, so it is difficult to compare cities. 
One of the earliest studies of a private fire department was a 1973 analysis of the 
Rural/Metro Company in Scottsdale. The study found that the city paid 47 percent less to 
Rural/Metro than it would to support a public department.20 In a 1977 study of 
Rural/Metro done by the now disbanded Institute for Local Self Governance, Scottsdale 
was compared to the cities of Tempe, Glendale, and Mesa, all of which are in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area. The Institute's study chose these cities because they have similar 
landscapes, geographic area, population, and median income level. Scottsdale did, 
however, have the highest median income, the largest geographic area and the least 
population density. Income and low density can be associated with reduced fire risk, 
while larger areas can increase cost and risk. 
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Figure 1: Per Capita Spending on Fire Protection 
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Source: Fire and Emergency Medical Services Assessment Scottsdale, Arizona. University City Science 
Center, 1989. 
In 1989, the City of Scottsdale hired an independent management and technical 
consulting team, the University City Science Center (UCSC) to analyze whether 
Scottsdale was receiving appropriate levels of fire and emergency services from its 
private providers. The consultants compared Rural/Metro to nine municipal fire 
companies in Arizona, Texas, and California. These cities were selected based on 
comparable population and land area. Because the UCSC study did not report using city 
selection criteria other than population and city size in acreage, it is hard to compare the 
quality of fire service for the cities in its study. Age and cost of houses, as well as types 
of land use patterns and industry in these cities could all have an impact on their cost of 
fighting fires. The three cities from the Institute for Local Self Governance's study did 
number among the UCSC comparison cities and there is more detail on those cities, but it 
dates from 1977 and may be outdated by the 1989 study. 
The UCSC report did look at land patterns and land usage in its study and states that at 
the time of the study, Scottsdale had a very low risk for fire. Almost entirely built since 
World War II in a suburban style, construction in the city was spread out with few 
contiguous buildings and few buildings over three stories tall, many of which had 
sprinklers. Scottsdale also had a very low risk for hazardous materials fires. In general, 
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the report stated that the city had few ofthe dangerous fire issues present in older urban, 
industrial population centers. The three cities used for comparison in the Institute study 
seem to have risk levels similar to Scottsdale. In fact, of the four cities in the Institute 
study, Scottsdale had the lowest percentage of houses under five years old. This is 
significant because newer houses are generally believed to present less of a fire danger. 
The 1977 Institute study found that differences in fire damage were slim between 
Scottsdale and the majority of the cities, but Scottsdale paid approximately half the cost 
of the other three cities. UCSC found that fire protection in Scottsdale cost 46 percent 
below the average of the service in other cities, while Scottsdale's cost per firefighter was 
slightly higher. When they analyzed a specific proposal to replace Rural/Metro with a 
public fire department, they found that a public department would increase the city's cost 
by 75 percent.21 
These figures were contested by the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) who 
claimed that the researchers had not taken into consideration the higher level of service 
that the other public departments offered when the firm did its cost estimates. It is true 
that the study did not make adjustments for levels of service between communities. It did 
state that the level of fire protection service in Scottsdale was adequate for the city. The 
report then recommended service improvements, including increased salaries, and 
strategies to make sure that service kept up with the city's rapidly growing population. 
According to Marc Eisner, Scottsdale's Director of Emergency Services and the city's 
liaison with Rural/Metro, all of the recommended changes have since been 
implemented. 22 
Elliott Sclar, in his recent book on privatization, says that these three studies of 
Scottsdale's fire protection service document an increasing rise in the City's fire 
protection costs over time. Although service cost is still less expensive in Scottsdale, it is 
consistently moving towards being more in line with the costs paid by its neighboring 
communities. Sclar says that rather than revealing that Rural/Metro is more efficient, this 
shows a relationship between population density and per capita fire costs. He describes 
Scottsdale as currently more similar to a rural community and predicts that as Scottsdale 
continues to urbanize and densify, its fire protection costs will continue to rise.23 
Sclar also sites examples of Arizona communities that have cancelled their Rural/Metro 
contracts and created their own municipal fire departments. These cities did so because 
of projected cost savings ofbetween $17,000 to $250,000 a year.24 He argues that if 
private fire service was really more cost-effective, there would be more support and 
demand for this service. The lack of demand is attributable, according to Sclar, to the 
fact that private fire service is not really less expensive. 
Opponents of fire department privatization, as well as those who oppose privatization in 
general, argue that private services may start out costing less but that contractors can low 
bid services, and then raise prices when the original contract is renewed. If this were to 
occur, it would hinder competition and potentially establish a monopoly. Critics also fear 
that once a company has established a monopoly, it will raise costs or lower service 
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quality when it is time to renew the original contract. At least one of the Arizona cities, 
Sun City, discussed by Sclar, felt that Rural/Metro kept raising its costs and was not open 
to price negotiation. In response, Sun City started its own municipal service and 
calculated that they would save $250,000 a year. Nearby Youngtown also cancelled its 
Rural/Metro service and contracted with Sun City's fire department estimating that they 
would also save money. 
If a municipality contracts with one fire protection provider, does that automatically 
constitute a monopoly? Some proponents of privatization believe that any situation 
where there is no competition, whether it involves a public or private service, could lead 
to reduce efficiency over time. A single company may have a contract with a 
municipality, but as long as there is an alternative that forces that company to remain 
efficient it is not necessarily a monopolistic situation. These alternatives range from 
contracting fire service from another municipality or starting their own service. Some 
communities, such as Scottsdale, try to maintain a competitive environment by retaining 
ownership of their firefighting infrastructure, which is then leased to the private 
company. 
Sclar contends that because the market for complex public services is easily 
monopolized, the existence of these alternatives does not necessarily guarantee 
competition. 25 This is because the learning curve for new providers is too steep and the 
start-up costs are too great for municipalities to easily switch fire protection service. He 
argues that even if there is a competitive bidding process, there is a built-in bias towards 
the existing provider who has more knowledge of the community. Like other critics of 
Rural/Metro in Scottsdale, Sclar believes that they have a monopoly. But, Sclar's own 
examples show that several cities that had previously contracted with Rural/Metro were 
able to either start their own fire companies or to contract with other municipalities. 
QUALITY 
One of the largest concerns expressed regarding privatization is that private companies 
will only be concerned with the bottom line and service quality will suffer. A report 
released by the Tennessee Comptroller's office reported that there are examples to back 
up people's fears of service decline due to privatization. They found that not all their 
state's government experiences with privatization had been positive. The authors point 
out that in all areas of privatization "there are stories to tell about how services have 
deteriorated once in private hands; how private companies were less responsive to citizen 
need; and how cost skyrocketed once the initial contract with a contractor expired." But 
the report's conclusion states that "most occurrences of abuse, fraud, poor service, and 
mismanagement are a result of poorly constructed contracts."26 
The Urban Institute's 1997 background paper on the privatization of public social 
services states that there has been very little empirical research on the effectiveness of the 
private sector versus the public sector. 27 The report cites a 1983 report for the Institute 
that compared matched pairs of public and private prisons and found that the quality of 
the private systems was somewhat higher, but they were not necessarily more 
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economically efficient. A 1996 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) came to 
the same conclusions. It examined public and private programs for tracking down child 
support and found that private services functioned as well or better than public services, 
but they were not always cheaper. 28 
According to Amy Benton, a representative for the Sacramento chapter of the 
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), private fire departments cannot provide 
the same quality of service as the public departments because private firms are not 
willing to pay for the high level offirefighting training that municipal departments have.29 
The IAFF also stresses that municipal firefighters are public servants committed to saving 
lives and that private firefighters do not get paid enough to risk their lives to save others, 
which of course would reduce the quality of service provided by private companies.30 
Again, because different communities have different needs, it is hard to compare training 
requirements. For example, a city with skyscrapers, like New York, would need to 
provide a different kind of training than a suburban community with only one- or two-
story buildings, like Scottsdale. 
There are some suggested universal training standards. The National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) along with the National Fire Service Professional Qualifications 
Board has developed voluntary Fire Service Professional Qualifications Standards for all 
uniformed positions within fire departments. Rural/Metro uses these standards as 
minimum requirements for all Scottsdale personnel including reserves.31 But, it seems to 
be agreed upon by other researchers that Rural/Metro does provide less training than 
municipal services and pays lower salaries, at least in Scottsdale.32 This could result in 
lower service quality and it has led to higher turnover rates for Scottsdale's fire service 
than other fire companies.33 This could be seen as a contracting issue, since any city 
contracting with a private fire company could require training standards and pay levels in 
the contract. 
There does seem to be a difference in philosophy between public and private fire 
departments which results in different approaches to service provision. Municipal 
services pride themselves on responding to and fighting fires. They focus on lowering 
response times and providing a variety of specialty services to expand the quality and 
range of their firefighting services, such as dealing with hazardous materials. Private 
companies focus on providing only the agreed upon services as efficiently as possible and 
finding new ways to reduce costs. This can be done by improving a community's 
prevention practices such as the example of Rural/Metro advocating for ordinances that 
require sprinkler systems in new buildings and remodels in Scottsdale. Another more 
questionable practice that Rural/Metro uses in Scottsdale is contracting out its services to 
neighboring communities or providing subscription services outside the city. While this 
may lower costs in Scottsdale, it has also resulted in Rural/Metro locating fire stations 
closer to the city's boundaries to meet these obligations. This has reduced average 
response times in Scottsdale.34 In his book, Sclar writes that fire response time for the 
arrival ofthe first vehicle to the scene is six minutes in Scottsdale. This is almost 50 
percent higher than the four minutes clocked by the nearby communities of Phoenix, 
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Tempe, and Glendale, three of the cities used as comparisons in the 1977 and 1989 
studies. Again, this difference could be attributed to the lower densities in Scottsdale. 
The above philosophy of prevention combined with providing the basic fire protection 
needs for the community as efficiently as possible is working for Rural/Metro in 
Scottsdale. Mayor Herbert Drinkwater told a New York Times reporter in 1985 that in 
Scottsdale the fire service" ... gets better all the time. We save 50 percent ofwhat 
neighboring cities pay. People are extremely satisfied."35 At this time, Scottsdale still 
relies on Rural/Metro for their fire protection. While fire protection costs have increased 
in Scottsdale because of growth and service improvement, according to Marc Eisen, 
Scottsdale's Director of Emergency Services, the city continues to pay less for its fire 
protection than surrounding cities.36 In Scottsdale's 2000 Citizen Survey, community 
members gave their fire protection service high ratings. In the sample of 600 residents, 
98 percent rated the fire service very good (highest rating) or good. 37 
The numbers appear to show that people have reason to be happy with Rural/Metro. In 
order to determine the levels of risk and service effectiveness in Scottsdale, the UCSC 
management team also compared the property loss figures, number of structure fires, and 
deaths per 1,000 ofthe population in Scottsdale to the same nine public fire departments 
previously discussed. They found that Scottsdale was 39 percent below the average for 
structural fires, 41 percent below the average for dollar loss from fire, and 15 percent 
below the average for deaths as a result offires.38 Both the 1977 Institute study and the 
1989 UCSC study found that Scottsdale's fire protection was providing citizens with a 
good level of service at a rate lower than surrounding communities. Again, this is 
partially based on the fire protection needs of Scottsdale, as well as the community's 
physical layout and structure of its buildings. Low-density development reduces fire 
danger but it also means more area to cover. All of these factors could influence not only 
the cost of fighting fires, but also the level of fire service needed by a community. 
JOB LOSS 
The most vocal opposition to privatization appears to come from public employee unions 
that accuse service privatization of eliminating public jobs. The Urban Institute reports 
that while public employee unions are opposed to privatization, it is not clear that 
workers themselves are opposed. This may be because government often includes 
employment arrangements, such as arranging for transfers to other government jobs or 
employment by the private company receiving the contract, as part of their privatization 
process, so workers are less fearful oflosing their jobs and benefits.39 
The 1997 International City/County Managers Association (ICMA) service provision 
survey of cities notes opposition from employees as one of the major obstacles to 
privatization, and the leading obstacle in 63.5 percent of responding cities.40 This was 
only one of two obstacles to privatization that grew in importance between the last ICMA 
survey in 1988 and its 1997 survey. All other obstacles decreased in significance. The 
survey also found an increase in cities reporting programs to minimize privatization's 
impact on employees, probably in an attempt to reduce resistance from employees. 
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While employees might be less wary of privatization if they are guaranteed jobs, the 
unions might still protest the decrease in public sector jobs that could reduce union 
membership. 
In 1989, the National Commission for Employment Policy (NCEP) reviewed 
employment and wage effects for city and county services that had been privatized in the 
previous ten years.41 The survey found that savings from privatization did not come at 
the expense of employee salaries, which on average are slightly higher in the private 
sector. However, when public sector employees move to the private sector, there is 
usually a reduction in benefits and the increase in pay may accompany longer work 
hours. In some situations this may be offset by profit sharing agreements for employees. 
The study also found that layoffs of employees due to privatization are uncommon. Most 
affected workers take jobs with the private contractor or move to other public agencies, 
again as part of the privatization package. Only about seven percent of workers lose their 
jobs. 
The promise of a private sector job might not be as effective in persuading public 
firefighters to accept privatization as it is with other public employees. Many of today' s 
firefighters, with a schedule that has them working only two to three days a week with 
the reminder of the week off, are able to hold a second job, run a business, or pursue 
other interests.42 Private fire companies have less flexible schedules, making public 
firefighting jobs unique and highly desirable. 
Osborne and Gaebler agree with many ofthe criticisms leveled at private companies. For 
example, they agree with privatization critics that private organizations tend to go for the 
most profitable business at the expense of those who are harder to serve. They also agree 
that while wages are comparable between public agencies and private companies, private 
organizations often give employees fewer benefits. Nor are private companies likely to 
make as much of an effort to hire women and minorities. But the authors argue, 
"Competition that is structured carefully ... can produce more equitable results than 
service delivery by a public monopoly."43 Local government can accomplish this by 
requiring contractors to provide wages and benefits equivalent to the public sector. 
Contracts can set performance standards that assure that all segments of society receive 
the same quality service and assure that other goals of government are met. 
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A SHORT HISTORY OF FIRE DEPARTMENTS 
The history of fire departments in the U.S. explains some of the negative sentiments 
surrounding their privatization. City government started providing fire service in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Before then, volunteer fire companies provided fire service. 
The first, the Union Fire Company, was established in Philadelphia in 1736 by Benjamin 
Franklin. Because ofthe serious threat fire posed to community economic and social 
stability at that time, the example soon spread to other towns and cities. 
Devastating fires were common in the United States' new cities in the 1700s and 1800s. 
The density of cities combined with highly flammable building materials and the use of 
fire for cooking, heating, and light guaranteed that fires would start and then spread 
rapidly. Until the advent of volunteer fire companies, very few fire insurance companies 
were able to stay in business. 
Early volunteer fire companies developed in response to these threats to community 
safety and economic viability. These companies had constitutions and by-laws and 
members were responsible for raising or contributing the operating funds. There was a 
prestige that went with membership. Members were often exempt from jury and militia 
duty, as well as from taxes. There was also a camaraderie that made the fire companies 
more like elite fraternities or clubs. This gave membership tremendous political and 
economic value, as it was a stepping stone to both better jobs and political office. Fire 
company rosters are a Who's Who" in colonial politics including: Franklin, Washington, 
Jefferson, Revere, Samuel Adams, Jay, Hancock, and Hamilton, to name a few. Frank 
McChesney, in his history of the rise of municipal fire departments, points out the fire 
departments were also able to deliver votes, making them "perhaps the single most 
important group in municipal politics."44 
Because of the political and economic importance of these companies to local 
government and to insurance companies, both started to pay companies bonuses for 
putting out fires. This made the competition between companies to reach the fire first 
fierce. Companies took to hiring thugs to help them battle competing companies at the 
fire scene to see who would have the opportunity to put out the fire. This increased 
violence and hindered the timely extinguishing of fires. It also undermined the elite 
nature of the fire companies and made them less reputable. In 1853, the City of 
Cincinnati claimed that the level of violence was forcing it to disband the city's volunteer 
companies and to initiate the first paid municipal fire department. By 1871, most large 
cities had followed Cincinnati's example and banned private fire companies. This does 
not seem to reflect on the companies' ability to fight the fires, but rather on the violence 
that erupted over the right to fight the fire. The economic practicality of moving to 
private fire companies was supported by the invention of the steam-powered water pump, 
which required less manpower to operate than earlier pumping methods. 
McChesney argues that it was not public interest in fire prevention or the increasing 
violence of fire companies that prompted city government to create municipal fire 
companies. If cities wanted to reduce the violent competition to reach a fire, they could 
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have stopped offering bonuses to the first one to the fire. Rather, he says, it was the 
convergence of multiple interests that led to the formation of municipal fire companies. 
Most large cities shifted to municipal fire companies during the era of city bosses and 
political machines where the passing out of jobs to increase political power and influence 
was commonplace. Regardless of whether or not city politicians benefited from making 
fire companies public, insurance companies did. They no longer had to pay volunteer 
companies to put out fires, as all residents bore that cost. The volunteer firemen shared 
the benefits: they were the ones selected for jobs with the public force. They no longer 
had to pay for their own room, board, and equipment. Instead, they had guaranteed 
salaries. 
Firefighting today still has many things in common with these early roots. Camaraderie 
is still very important to public fire departments and the difficulty of getting a firefighting 
job helps retain some of the elitism of the early companies. An article in the Sacramento 
Bee, "Hot-Ticket Job: Many Feel Called to Firefighting but Few Are Chosen," points out 
that while record levels of unemployment have created a worker shortage in many fields, 
firefighting "consistently draws [a] hundred applicants for every opening." The article 
attributes this to decent pay, the flexible work schedule, the excitement, and the lure of"a 
good guy career."45 No doubt some ofthe political and economic reasons for the support 
of municipal fire departments also still exist, along with the fear that private companies 
are more concerned with profit than with the public good. 
But volunteer firefighting companies have not disappeared. While our biggest cities have 
professional fire departments, volunteer companies remain strong in smaller communities 
across the United States. According to the National Volunteer Fire Council, 
approximately 74 percent of all firefighters in the United States are still volunteers and 
they help protect over 40 percent of U.S. residents.46 Many fire departments in the U.S. 
are entirely volunteer-staffed. 
THE BURNING DEBATE OVER FIRE DEPARTMENT 
PRIVATIZATION 
The president of a private emergency services company explains that the move towards 
fire protection privatization in a community usually starts out as an economic issue and 
turns into a political one.47 The Reason Foundation's Director of Privatization and 
Government Reform agrees that the decision of whether or not to privatize is not 
necessarily an economic decision. He adds that politics often keep privatization from 
occurring even when it is a good economic decision.48 According to one researcher, there 
is an economic rationale to not privatize, but it does not concern municipal cost savings. 
Union opposition to privatization is politically and financially costly (in terms of 
campaign costs) to local elected officials. Local elected officials must weigh the benefits 
of lower service costs with their personal costs, which could be increased by labor 
unions' reelection opposition.49 
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The public can also be quite adamant in their opposition to the perceived loss of local 
control over fire service. While people are certainly concerned about the protection of 
their homes and general community safety, this does not fully explain the intensity of a 
community's reaction to any suggestion that their local fire department be taken from the 
community and given to a private company or to another government entity. Private 
ambulance services are common. Most airports and some large corporations have private 
fire service and we do not feel unsafe at airports or at our places of work, at least not 
from the threat of fire. Why are people so concerned about local fire department 
privatization? Some of the charges commonly leveled at private departments- that 
private firefighters are not adequately trained; that they use volunteers or reservists for 
some of their force so the service is not adequate- seem to contradict the U.S. history of 
volunteer firefighters and our continued reliance in many communities on volunteer 
departments. In many cases, the charge that the community will lose control over its fire 
protection service is also exaggerated. Municipalities will often maintain ultimate control 
over their fire service, setting service standards, continuing to own infrastructure, and 
sometimes retaining the right to hire and fire employees. 
Robert Kuttner, an economist, explains citizens' strong reaction to privatization this way: 
"[I]n certain areas oflife the criteria of the private market seems inappropriate. That is 
because human beings are not solely economic creatures. They have social attachments, 
patriotic stirrings, religious commitments, family bonds and psychological needs, some 
of which contradict the textbook view of economic man. It offends us, as citizens, to 
have national symbols auctioned off to the highest bidder." He continues, "In organized 
society, we counterpoise certain public values to those of a pure market. Some things 
aren't supposed to be bought and sold."50 
Eric Oldar, of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, says that 
firefighters have become a "trusted symbol" to people. 51 Firefighters have long been 
heroes to us. Often they are children's first role models. The shiny red engine and the 
capable looking firefighters are tangible images of the success and safety of a 
community. The local fire department is not just a government service, it is a member of 
our community that reflects our community's civic life and our shared values. When 
community members feel that they can no longer control the institutions that are the 
foundation of civic life and their own well being, they can feel uncomfortable and even 
outraged. 
One theory that supports the idea of fire protection as a community value is the 
accountability factor. 52 It argues that there is accountability in government services 
because there is someone who is responsible for making sure that services are provided 
and that they meet certain standards. The more valued a service is to society, and the 
greater losses are if the service standards are not mP,t, the less likely it is to be contracted 
out because it becomes harder to guarantee accountability. The value of a service is 
determined in a democracy both by society's values and legal and political 
considerations. The cost savings from privatizing a valued service are reduced because 
the costs of assuring quality standards are higher. This may partially explain why fire 
protection, with its high social value, is not contracted out more often: it has costs that are 
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intuitively understood although they are not factored into standard cost-benefit analyses. 
However, not every community rejects the idea of private fire protection. Private 
firefighters now protect over one million people in 16 states.53 Below are some examples 
of private fire services. 
RURAL/METRO CORPORATION-HOW TO SUCCEED AS A PRIVATE FIRE PROTECTION 
PROVIDER 
Rural/Metro is the largest and arguably the most successful private fire company in the 
United States. It started in an unincorporated area outside ofPhoenix, Arizona in 1948. 
A group of neighbors started a fire subscription service after watching a neighbor's house 
burn to the ground because neither the city nor the county would answer a fire call out of 
their service area. Rural/Metro was profitable in its first year. 
In 1954, when the area was incorporated as Scottsdale, the city made the uncommon 
decision to contract with Rural/Metro for its fire protection service. Rural/Metro 
continues to provide the city with fire protection services to this day. 
Rural/Metro's story reveals some of the elements that private fire departments need in 
order to be successful. The city has a stringent contract with the company that spells out 
in detail service levels, equipment, reporting, and firefighting training requirements. This 
allows the city to set quality standards and hold Rural/Metro to these standards. The 
company's rate of profit is regulated by the Arizona State Corporate Commission, that 
regulation prevents Rural/Metro from reducing its costs to increase their profits to the 
detriment of service quality. Rural/Metro started in a community that not only did not 
have municipal fire protection, but had no fire protection at all. By the time Scottsdale 
incorporated, Rural/Metro had proven its effectiveness and had become a part of the 
community. 
The 1989 study by University City Science Center (UCSC), commissioned by the City of 
Scottsdale, found that the city had a per capita fire loss of about $13. The city next door, 
Tempe, had fire losses of about $26 per capita. While Scottsdale spent approximately 
$39 per person on fire and emergency service costs, Tempe spent about $46 (See Figure 
2). The study also measured the levels of risk and service effectiveness in Scottsdale. It 
looked at the number of structural fires, property loss, and deaths per 1,000 ofthe 
population in Scottsdale and compared those numbers to figures for nine public fire 
departments in Arizona, California, and Texas. As noted earlier, the study found that 
Scottsdale was significantly below the average for structural fires, dollar loss from fire, 
and deaths as a result of fires. While past studies found Tempe to be comparable to 
Phoenix in a number of categories, the UCSC study was less exacting in their criteria. As 
described earlier, a number of characteristics could affect the level of service, and 
therefore the cost of service, that a community needs. This includes housing stock age, 
density of development, building height, and type of industry located in the community. 
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Figure 2: Costs Relating to Fire 
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Center, 1989. 
Rural/Metro has since expanded across the country, but the company sticks to a formula. 
It focuses on rural or growing suburban communities that do not already have municipal 
fire protection. The company reports that it has been threatened so often by unions that it 
will no longer bid against unionized fire departments. 54 Because of this, the communities 
who are using private sector fire protection are found in states like Arizona, Georgia, 
Illinois, Oregon, and Tennessee, where there is less of a history of municipal fire 
protection. 
LEWISTON (IDAHO) RURAL FIRE SERVICE (LRFS)- SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES 
Lewiston Rural Fire Service (LRFS), a subscription fire department that serves residents 
ofLewiston County, started in 1983 and is totally supported by subscription fees: an 
individual can choose whether or not to sign up for fire protection. While the City of 
Lewiston had a public fire department, efforts at the polls to form a county department 
failed. 
LRFS structured its rates to conform to the amount of money residents would save on 
insurance for having fire protection and it estimates that 80 percent of the community 
determined whether or not to subscribe to the service based on the savings on their home 
insurance. According to LRFS Fire Chief Michael Supkis, "Reluctance to subscribe 
$80.00 
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stems from independence, isolation and denial. Rural residents are fiercely independent. 
An l-ean-take-care-of-myself attitude, coupled with resistance to regulation and 
government interference are strong deterrents to relying on what seems to be a 
government type agency. "55 This resistance to supporting government services is what 
makes communities like Lewiston County fertile ground for private fire service. 
LRFS appears to have been effective in reducing fires and improving safety. The number 
of fires in Lewiston County went down more than 60 percent in four years, claims 
Supkis.56 The challenge to having a subscription service in Lewiston County, according 
to Supkis, is that more than 90 percent of fire and emergency calls come from non-
subscribers and the department only sees these fires as a priority if they endanger 
subscriber property. 57 While LRFS will respond to all structure fires in its service area 
and places human life as its first priority, the department will not necessarily put out your 
fire if you are not a subscriber. 
Some people see this policy as callous and proof that business only cares about its bottom 
line. Originally, the department put out all fires whether or not they affected subscribers, 
but this became too great of a financial burden. Supkis reports that the public has not 
been critical of this policy. He thinks this is partly because of the department's ongoing 
information campaign that lets residents know the department's policies. And, as the 
RuraVMetro example points out, public companies do not necessarily respond to calls if 
they are out of their service area. One of the major downsides to subscription services is 
that owners oflower value homes, which may be more susceptible to fire, are the least 
likely to find value in paying for fire service. This is usually because they do not have 
fire insurance or save enough money on their insurance to justifY subscribing to fire 
protection services. 
DOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE-ATTEMPTING TO PRIVATIZE PUBLIC SERVICES 
Dover, New Hampshire provides an example of what can happen when local government 
tries to privatize existing municipal fire protection services. When the City of Dover 
decided to become the first city in New England to contract for private fire ighting 
services they started what the editorial page ofthe local paper called "a bloodless coup" 
that has "split the city like a civil war."58 
In 1982 the City ofDover started to investigate the contracting out offirefighting services 
to save the city money. The city's service costs were increasing rapidly. Education costs 
had risen from $6 million in 1981 to $9.7 million in 1982, with municipal service costs 
rising from $3.4 million to $5.7 million in the same year. 
The fire protection contract the city signed with Wackenhut, a private emergency services 
company, saved the city over $100,000 a year and maintained the city's control over fire 
department employees and operations. Thirty-six ofthe city's 42 firefighters were to be 
retained. Their work hours would increase but so would salaries, giving Dover's 
firefighters the highest starting salary in the area. They would also be guaranteed yearly 
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increases and a yearly pension contribution, although benefits would not be as generous 
as they had been with the city. 
The Dover firefighters refused to work for a private company. They argued that even 
though the city said they had built adequate controls into the contract, including a 
$500,000 performance bond in case the contract was broken, Wackenhut would 
eventually cut back services to save money. They also accused Wackenhut of union 
busting, although the firefighters that Wackenhut retained would still be part of the union. 
Finally, the firefighters argued that they would lose their "espirit de corps" that allowed 
them to work well together. 
While the city had contracted out a variety of services since 1978, the city's pursuit of 
fire department privatization, according to the local newspaper "struck at some sacred 
beliefs and traditions and burgeoned into a heated and sometimes bitter controversy."59 
This debate preoccupied the city for a year, with one side touting it as a great money 
saver for the city and the other decrying it as playing Russian Roulette with public safety. 
The casualties of the debate include the ousting ofthe three city council members who 
voted for privatization and the 2-1 passage of a referendum changing the city charter to 
ban the private contracting of city services. By January of 1984, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire decided that the city's contract with Wackenhut was invalid and 
nullified the contract. 
ALARM FOR FIRE DEPARTMENTS 
The business of providing fire protection is changing regardless of whether the fire 
service is private or public. While calls to fire departments have gone up in the last 
decade, most of the increase is attributed to emergency medical calls and false alarms. 
The actual number of fire calls has decreased. Structural fires have steadily decreased 
since their height in 1977. They dropped especially dramatically during the 1980s, 
decreasing 37 percent from 1977 through 1989 and then falling an additional25 percent 
from 1989 to 1999 (Figure 3).60 
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Figure 3: Comparison of U.S. Fires by Type between 1977 and 1999 
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Many public fire departments are seeing this decrease in fire calls, along with the threat 
of privatization, as a wakeup call. Municipal fire departments seem to be recognizing the 
need to improve the way they do things and are implementing the same practices that 
private firms are using to increase efficiency. At a recent panel of fire chiefs at the 2000 
League of California Cities conference, Alan Brunacini, Chief of the Phoenix Fire 
Department, pointed out that fire departments have been doing it the same way for 1 OOs 
of years and its time for them to evaluate how they do things and make some changes. 61 
The International Association of Firefighters, the public fire department union, has 
published a handbook called Responding to Privatization. While the Association gives 
advice on how to prevent privatization, it says the best strategy to avoid privatization "is 
to deliver quality service for a reasonable cost to the community." It goes on to 
recommend that fire departments monitor their quality of service and implement new 
services as their communities change and grow.62 
As municipal departments look for ways to respond to changing community demands, 
they are focusing on three strategies: expanding the range of emergency services they 
provide, consolidation, and intergovernmental contracting. Municipal fire departments 
are competing with private firms to expand into medical aid, such as ambulance and 
paramedic services. This area of emergency services traditionally has been less resistant 
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to provision by private companies. The debate over who should control this market 
intensified in the 1990s. Both public and private fire departments are looking to expand 
their markets and to become more efficient by cross-training employees and using the 
free time that firefighters have when they are not fighting fires in more productive ways. 
The private firms are motivated by profit, while the public departments realize they need 
to expand their missions as fire calls decrease. Both the City of Los Angeles and the City 
of Sacramento have reincorporated formerly privately provided medical aid back into 
their fire departments. 
Community outreach seems to be an important component when communities are 
considering altering their fire protection service. In 1995, Westminster, California 
became one of the first cities in California to bid out its fire service. It accepted bids 
from other public fire departments as well as private sector providers. The city selected 
an intergovernmental service contract with a Joint Public Agency (JP A), the Orange 
County Fire Authority, potentially saving the city $11 million over five years and beating 
out the Rural/Metro bid by $500,000. 63 The bidding out of service was bitterly protested 
by Westminster's former firefighters, who launched a recall campaign against the four of 
five council members who had approved contracting out. In this case, one analysis 
claimed that the recall effort failed because the council made the case that if the public 
wanted to afford increased police protection, the city needed to save money by 
contracting out fire service. Understanding the reasons behind the contracting decision 
made the public willing to support the action. It is also important to note that at this time 
Orange County and some of its cities, including Westminster, were faced with 
bankruptcy.64 This crisis certainly played a role in the City's decision to contract out 
services and perhaps made the decision less controversial. It may also have been affected 
by the fact that the service was going to be provided by another public entity. Although 
this move can also be controversial, there are fewer opposing arguments. 
WHY NOT IN CALIFORNIA? 
Privatization of fire protection services seems to have found its place in rural 
communities and rapidly growing suburban areas. These areas are often unincorporated 
and do not have access to existing fire department services, either from a city or county. 
Starting a new fire company can cost millions of dollars, and can be a huge burden for a 
sparsely populated or new community especially if it will take years to fully develop. If a 
community cannot afford its own fire department, its options for fire protection at a 
reasonable cost are limited: the community can agree to some sort of special district or 
tax to pay for contract services (either with a private or public entity); or a private firm 
can provide a subscription service. 
Many California communities fit the description of the communities in other states that 
have chosen to contract with a private company or subscription services. However, to 
date there have been no private fire companies serving communities in the state. One of 
the reasons is a tradition of municipal fire service. 
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Even without private firms, the provision of fire protection in California can be 
competitive. Many cities have contracted with counties or other cities. The Sacramento 
Metropolitan Fire District, formerly known as the American River Fire District, is 
consolidating with the Sacramento County Fire District to create the seventh largest local 
firefighting operation in California. The merger was prompted in part by a 1998 budget 
shortfall for the American River Fire District. The new district is the result of multiple 
fire agency mergers in the last 17 years. In a 1992 interview, Manteca fire chief Charles 
Rule said that the regional and county consolidation of fire services is the most promising 
approach for resolving financial difficulties.65 Oakland's Fire Chief Gerald Simon, in a 
September 2000 conversation, agreed saying that consolidation was more likely to 
happen in California than privatization.66 
Contracting with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) is also 
a way for local government to save money. For example, CDF has contracts to provide 
fire protection for all of Riverside County and the City of Highland, to name two. 
Contracting with CDF usually saves a community money on fire protection for the same 
reason that private firms are able to reduce costs: the state pays lower wages and 
employees work longer hours than municipal firefighters. Like private firms, CDF and 
counties are cautious about contracting with cities that already have established fire 
departments. 67 
Many California communities depend on special districts to provide their fire service. 
Special districts are local government entities that are funded by property taxes or 
assessments. Special districts have elected governing bodies that decide their policies 
and service standards. In some ways these special districts are like subscription services 
that do not have to answer to a government entity but only directly to their clients. These 
districts, along with other available fire protection services, provide a variety of options 
for California communities. 
Two recent bills in the California State Legislature have tried to amend the state 
constitution to make it impossible for local government to contract with private firms for 
fire or police protection. SCA 30, the Citizens Public Safety and Security Act of 1998, 
would have prohibited the state or a local government from, "entering into any contract, 
franchise agreement, or other arrangement in which an essential public safety service, 
which is defined to mean fire, police, sheriff, probation, corrections, or other peace 
officer services, would be provided by private means." In 1999, essentially the same bill 
was introduced as SCA 10, the Citizens Public Safety and Security Act of2000. Neither 
bill passed. However, Senate Bill 402 did pass and become law in 2000 (Chapter 906, 
Statutes of2000).68 This law mandates binding arbitration for police and firefighters. If 
local control is one of the key issues discouraging privatization, some community 
members may see this law as eroding that control. If local government has less control 
over how much it pays firefighters with the passage of this law, communities may have 
more incentive to contract out their fire protection service. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority of researchers agree that privatizing fire service saves communities money. 
Critics of fire protection privatization argue that this is because municipal fire 
departments provide better and more dependable service, which costs more. They also 
contend that private companies pay employees less and provide fewer benefits. Those 
who support privatization say that when a community contracts with a private fire 
company, it decides the level of service and the standards for its fire protection service. 
The community can also determine wages and benefit levels for employees. 
Communities that contract with private companies do not seem to have greater loss of 
property and life than those served by municipal or volunteer fire companies. 
Most communities have subscription or private fire protection because municipal services 
do not exist and private companies are able to fill those gaps. California, with a strong 
history of municipal fire protection, has fewer market entry points for private companies. 
California communities also have a variety of fire protection options besides 
privatization. Intergovernmental contracting, either between cities and counties or 
between local governments and the California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection, is popular. 
Special districts that provide fire protection are common alternatives in more rural or 
unincorporated areas. Special district consolidation seems to be growing in popularity as 
a way to reduce costs and improve service. Between 1980 and 1998, in spite ofhigh 
levels of population growth and development in the state, the number of fire districts in 
California decreased from 447 to 391. District consolidation could be especially 
attractive to some special districts. Although single-county special districts providing fire 
protection service were exempt from the 1993-1994 Education Reform Augmentation 
Funds (ERAF) shift, they did lose property tax dollars in the 1992-1993 ERAF shift. In 
contrast, multi-county districts that existed before Proposition 13 passed were exempt 
from both ERAF shifts and were able to keep their original allocation of property tax 
dollars. Districts that consolidate within county lines continue to shift property tax 
dollars to schools. But, as the consolidation of the American River Fire District and the 
Sacramento County Fire District has shown, when an exempt multi-county special district 
merges with a special district that is paying ERAF, the new entity is exempt. It is 
estimated that this Sacramento merger will allow the new district to keep between 
$300,000 and $1 million a year in funds that previously went to the ERAF shift. 
While these options could spur efficiency, it is clear that the decision to change a 
community's fire protection service, even if it is still being provided by another 
government entity, can be highly contentious. While the strongest opposition to 
privatization is usually attributed to public employee unions and their members, 
community members may also be resistant. In the case of intergovernmental contracting, 
employees may be supportive because of higher wages, but community residents 
continue to contest these actions. It seems that when a change in community fire service 
occurs, there is often an elected official who pays the price and loses the confidence of 
the community. Communication and outreach may help ease the transition, but residents 
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value having their own fire protection and may see it as a defining institution in their 
community. 
Although private fire service may not be a popular option for local government in 
California, the old vision of local fire protection is changing. The new law, SB 402, 
could remove some of fire department wage control from local governments and may 
force communities to consider other available options to reduce costs. Given community 
members' focus on local control, they may see these alternatives as actually increasing 
their control and no longer contest these changes. Finally, even municipal fire 
departments seem to recognize the need to look at how they provide services and have 
incorporated some of the same techniques that private companies use. They seem to be 
leaning towards consolidation with other communities or forming larger special districts. 
They are also looking into expanding into medical aid services. In the end, it may be 
municipal fire departments that take the lead in providing more efficient fire protection 
and emergency services. But the question remains: would they have done so without the 
threat of competition from private departments? 
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